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Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs
Melissa Hartt
Systemic employment discrimination is a structural, social harm whose
victims include not only those who can be specifically identified, but also many
who cannot. Pattern and practice claims in employment litigation are an
essential tool for challenging this structural harm. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes brushes aside the systemic
nature of the plaintiffs' claims, making both theoreticaland doctrinalmistakes
in its application of the procedural and substantive law applicable in
employment discriminationclass action litigation. The most troublingpart of
the Court's opinion-its rejection of statistical modeling for remedial
determinations-has received little attention. This article critiques the
Court's novel and careless interpretationof Title VII and explains the threat
the opinionposes to the continued viability ofpattern andpracticeclaims.
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I.
INTRODUCTION

A claim of "pattern and practice" employment discrimination is a
The harm done when
claim that challenges a systemic wrong.

t Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. I am grateful to Tristin Green, Noah
Zatz, Richard Ford, and Michael Selmi for their comments both in our initial conversation as a working
group and in their feedback on this article.
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discrimination is an employer's "standard operating procedure-the regular
rather than unusual practice" is not simply the aggregation of a large
number of individual wrongs.' It is a structural, social harm whose victims
include not only those who can be specifically identified, but also many
who cannot.
And yet, even in cases purporting to address systemic claims, courts
have too often remained focused on the individual wrongs that are data
points in the overarching story of structural injury.2 This has not been
uniformly true; in many cases over the past few decades, courts have
recognized the importance of widening their focus to the structural and
systemic harm caused by an employer's discrimination.' The district court
in Dukes v. Wal-Mart followed in this tradition, particularly in framing a
proposed remedial phase that would account for the ways in which the harm
caused by a pattern and practice of discrimination often cannot be observed
by a narrow focus on individual decisions.'
In sharply criticizing the district court, the Supreme Court's Wal-Mart
decision brushed aside the systemic nature of the plaintiffs' claims without
a word of analysis.s The Court's myopic focus on the individual claims that
each woman at Walmart might have against the company-or more
accurately, on the individual defenses that Walmart might have to each
individual claim-was essential to each part of the Court's opinion. While
a good deal of attention has been paid to the heightened requirements the
opinion announces for proving Rule 23(a) "commonality," equally
troubling is the opinion's cursory concluding section, which asserts that
statistical modeling is not a permissible method for assessing damages at
the remedy phase of a pattern and practice case.' Instead, the Court
concludes, a district court considering whether to certify a class must

1. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977).
2. As Professor Green explains well in her piece, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment,
neither courts nor commentators have been entirely careful in their theoretical explanations for the law
of systemic disparate treatment. . See generally, Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate
Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 395 (2011). Just as the
substantive harm done by systemic discrimination is distinct from the substantive harm of individual
discrimination, however, systemic disparate treatment law has long played a separate and essential role
in the enforcement of Title VIl. See id. at 452-457.
3. See, e.g., McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 281 (5th Cir. 2008); Domingo v. New
Eng. Fish Co. (Domingo 1l), 727 F.2d 1429, 1442-45 (9th Cir. 1984); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co.
(Pettway V), 681 F.2d 1259, 1264-66 (1lth Cir. 1982); Hameed v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 519-21 (8th Cir. 1980); Wells v. Myer's Bakery,
561 F.2d 1268, 1274-75 (8th Cir. 1977); Women's Comm. Equal Employment Opportunity v. National
Broad. Co., 76 F.R.D. 173, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 45253 (7th Cir. 1976).
4. 222 F.R.D. 137, 173-86 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff'd, 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd, WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
5. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553-61.
6. Id at 2560-61.
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assume that a defendant will present each and every defense it might have
to each individual class members' right to relief.
This essay considers the many theoretical and doctrinal flaws that
underlie the Court's casual conclusion (a conclusion made even more
troubling by the fact that all nine Justices joined it at least in part). The
Court's rejection of statistical modeling for remedial determinations rests
on a novel interpretation of Title VII that leads to a misapplication of the
Rules Enabling Act.' The fact that the four dissenting Justices in the case
signed on to this section of the decision is itself evidence of how little
thought or discussion went into it. There is no way to reconcile the
assertion that a defendant has a statutory right to insist on trying every
single individual defense it might have to each individual potential plaintiff
with the dissent's view that employment discrimination class actions could
be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), which requires
that common questions predominate over individual questions.
The logical and doctrinal flaws in the Court's assertions about the
remedial phase of an employment discrimination class action are deeply
consequential. Statistical modeling to determine class-wide remedies is the
only way that many systemic claims can be remedied. In many cases, the
"rough justice" of a class-wide remedy will be the fairest and most efficient
deterrent remedy and will be the best way to make whole those who have
been harmed by discrimination. In fact, without the statistical modeling
that is often necessary for systemic remedies, the continued viability of
pattern and practice claims will be substantially undermined. Individual
claims alone simply will not ensure-or even permit-full enforcement of
federal civil rights laws.'
I will begin in Part II by explaining what the Court concluded in its
final section of Wal-Mart and why the conclusions are legally unsound and
reflect a lack of careful analysis. Part III considers the need for statistical
modeling in assessing remedies for systemic discrimination. Finally, in

7. Id.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). The Rules Enabling Act authorized the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. If a Federal Rule were to "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,"
it would be outside the scope of the Enabling Act. Harsh application of procedural rules often leads to
limitations on substantive rights. This is one of those exceedingly rare moments in which unreasonable
interpretation of the substantive rules has led to similarly unreasonable interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
9. See, e.g., Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth is Out There: Revamping Federal
Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 193
(2009)(discussing a range of enforcement limitations, including excessive reliance on individual claims);
Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 Akron L. Rev. 813, 841-844
(2004)(noting that multi-party claims are essential to full enforcement of civil rights laws); Tristin
Green, Discriminationin Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 91, 151-157 (2003)(discussing the need for systemic claims to
challenge structural workplace discrimination).
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Part IV, I suggest some paths forward that could preserve the viability of
the pattern and practice claim.
II.
WHAT THE COURT SAID AND WHY IT IS WRONG

In the section of the Wal-Mart opinion that received unanimous
support, the Supreme Court addressed whether class actions could be
certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) when the plaintiffs
sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages. 23(b)(2) provides a
mechanism for certification when "the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole.""o Although most circuits had concluded
that back pay or other monetary relief could be included in class suits
certified under 23(b)(2), there was considerable disagreement among the
lower courts about the precise circumstances in which such inclusion was
appropriate."
The bulk of the Court's discussion of 23(b)(2) considers the broad
question of whether that provision of the rule can be used to certify claims
that seek any type of monetary damages.12 The Court's conclusion-that
23(b)(2) is not an appropriate provision for certification of employment
discrimination claims that include requests for back pay-upended settled
law in almost every circuit. Despite its considerable disruption of existing
law, that holding was not surprising. More than 15 years ago, the Court had
foreshadowed concern about permitting class claims for monetary damages
without a clear provision for individual plaintiffs to opt out of the class."
Moreover, this portion of the Court's analysis alone would not seriously
inhibit employees' ability to challenge structural discrimination. While
obtaining certification under Rule 23(b)(3)'s "catch-all" provision would be
harder for class plaintiffs than the Rule 23(b)(2) approach has been, it
would not be impossible, if that was all that the Court had said on the
matter. The troubling portion of this section of the decision comes in the
final, unnecessary paragraphs.

10.
11.
686407.
12.
13.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 56, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2011 WL
See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547-60.
See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994).
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Giving OldLaw New Meaning

In the brief, final sub-part of the Wal-Mart opinion, the Court noted
that some of the Courts of Appeals had held that claims in which money
damages were "incidental" to injunctive relief could be certified under Rule
23(b)(2). The Court declined to decide whether that view was correct,
noting that the Wal-Mart plaintiffs would not have been able to meet that
standard and were not arguing that they could.14
Having introduced the question as one that was not necessary to its
decision in this case, the Court nonetheless went on to comment on it and to
do so in a couple of paragraphs with very little analysis or discussion, but
considerable potential to make systemic disparate treatment claims next-toimpossible to certify.
The Court began with the statement that "Wal-Mart is entitled to
individualized determinations of each employee's eligibility for backpay."I
As support for this conclusion, the Court cited sections 706(g)(1) and
706(g)(2)(A) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 These are two
among the statute's remedial provisions, both describing the scope of a
court's authority to award certain types of damages. Section 706(g)(1)
provides that, after making a finding of discriminatory conduct, a court
"may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
[including] reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay .. . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."' 7
Section 706(g)(2)(A) provides that "[n]o order of the court shall require
the ... payment to [an individual] of any back pay if such individual
[suffered an adverse action] for any reason other than discrimination. . . ."
The Wal-Mart Court reads these provisions, and particularly 706(g)(2)(A),
as granting the defendant a right to put on individualized defenses as to
each class member, and thus as foreclosing statistical modeling to assess an
appropriate class-wide back pay remedy.'I
Despite the novelty of this reading of 706(g)(2)(A), the opinion goes
on to suggest that it was these provisions of Title VII that were interpreted
in Teamsters v. United States, the case that established the framework for
trying pattern and practice claims.20 In Teamsters, a decision that never

14.

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560.

15.

Id

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) et seq. (2006).
42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(1).
§2000e-5(g)(2)(A).
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560-61.
Id.
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cited either of these sections of Title VII, 2 1 the Court held that "[w]hen the
plaintiff seeks individual relief such as reinstatement or backpay after
establishing a pattern or practice of discrimination, 'a district court must
usually conduct additional proceedings . .. to determine the scope of

individual relief."' 22 The Teamsters decision itself goes on to emphasize the
importance of district court flexibility in fashioning the remedial phase of
pattern and practice litigation to satisfy the goals of Title VII. 23 In WalMart, however, the Court reads the flexibility out of Teamsters and
reframes that venerable decision to stand for the proposition that, at this
remedial stage of the litigation, the defendant "will have the right to raise
any individual affirmative defenses it may have, and to 'demonstrate that
the individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for lawful
reasons. "24
The Court then quickly dismissed what it described as the district
court's "Trial by Formula" proposal for handling the remedial phase in
Wal-Mart.25 The district court in Wal-Mart had proposed a remedial phase
that did not include individualized hearings on each class member.26
Instead, if the plaintiffs successfully demonstrated a pattern or practice of
discrimination, the court proposed that it would calculate both total classwide damages and individual entitlement to damages using some system for
estimating lost wages and taking account of mitigation. The district court
declined to set forth a specific system for remedial assessment at the class
certification stage, but it did determine that the remedies would be
calculated "through a formula" determined at the appropriate time. 27 But
the Supreme Court rejected this approach, concluding that it would deny
Walmart its statutory right to put on individualized defenses to every
claimant and therefore would violate the Rules Enabling Act's prohibition
against procedural rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right." 28
21. At the time of the Teamsters decision, these provisions of Title VII were numbered differently,
but were, in substance, identical to what they are today. The addition of 706(g)(2)(B) in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 led to the renumbering of these pre-existing remedial provisions. See Pub. L. No. 108-198,
105 Stat. 1071 (1991); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
22. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560-61 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 361 (1977)).
23. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 364.
24. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362).
25. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
26. 222 F.R.D. at 175-178.
27. Id. at 182-83 and 185-86. The district court rejected Walmart's argument that individualized
hearings were required because of the Civil Rights Act of 1991's so-called "same action" defense, added
as § 706(g)(2)(b), because the plaintiffs were not claiming that Walmart had engaged in "mixed-motive"
discrimination, prohibited under § 702(m). The district court concluded that the same-decision defense
is only available when plaintiffs are asserting mixed-motive claims. Id. at 186-87. The Supreme Court
did not consider these provisions of Title VII in reaching its decision.
28. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
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These brief paragraphs of the Wal-Mart decision, joined by all nine
Justices, could cause more trouble for pattern and practice claims than any
other part of the decision. By rejecting statistical modeling as a permissible
remedial approach, the Court reduces the structural and systemic claim to
the sum of its individual parts and gives those individual parts the power to
destroy the whole. The decision rests on the weak foundation of: (1) a
novel interpretation of Title VII's section 706(g)(2)(A); (2) a narrowing of
the Teamsters decision; and (3) a misunderstanding about the substantive
nature of a finding of pattern or practice liability. Moreover, the decision is
entirely inconsistent with the views of the dissenting Justices as to the
viability of class certification of employment discrimination claims under
23(b)(3).
B.

Logical Leaps, Analytical Flaws

The Court concluded that certifying a class on the theory that the
remedial phase of the lawsuit could be conducted without individualized
hearings on each class member's right to damages would violate the Rules
Enabling Act. For this conclusion to be correct, two things must be true:
(1) defendants must have a substantive right to present individualized
defenses to each class members' claim to damages; and (2) that right must
be altered by the operation of Rule 23. Neither of these premises is correct.
1.

Section 706(g)(2)(A)

The provision of Title VII on which the Court focused to justify its
assertion that defendants have been given a statutory right to individualized
remedial hearings has been the subject of very little judicial analysis. Not
until this decision has the Supreme Court read the language of section
706(g)(2)(A) to confer a substantive statutory right on the defendant.29 It is
a reading unsupported by the language of the statute, which is written as a
command to the court, not as a grant of rights to any party. It is also
inconsistent with the Court's discussion of the provision in earlier cases,
which have focused exclusively on the appropriateness of court-ordered
affirmative action as a remedy for discrimination.
Section 706(g)(2)(A) directs that "[n]o order of the court shall require
the . .. payment to [an individual] of any back pay if such individual
[suffered an adverse action] for any reason other than discrimination. . . ."3 0
By its terms, the provision "does not speak to the actions of private parties;

29. When Title VII was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the language at issue here
received a new subsection number. See supra note 21. The language itself was unchanged, and this
9
discussion considers both pre- and post-19 1 analysis.
30. §2000e-5(g)(2)(A).
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only a court is limited by it."' Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's prior
decisions have consistently described the provision as one "which defines
the remedies available under Title VII." 32 Moreover, section 706(g)(2)(A)
is included in the section of the law titled "Enforcement Provisions,"" and
the language of the provision very plainly directs itself only to the remedies
a court may order.
In other parts of Title VII, Congress has granted defendants the
statutory right to present particular defenses in clear and straightforward
language. For example, when the legislature codified the "mixed motive"
provisions of Title VII in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, it included not just a
command to the courts about the appropriate scope of their remedial
authority, but also directives to the parties about their respective burdens of
proof. Specifically, this subsection of the statute provides that:
"On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would
have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor, the court"(i) may grant [certain remedies]; and

"(ii) shall not award damages or [certain other remedies]." 34
In specifying proof requirements for both mixed-motive claims and the
corresponding "same action" defense, the language of this subsection is
very different from section 706(g)(2)(A)'s directive about the content of a
court's remedial order. The remedial portion of the mixed motive claim
was added to the statute in a section immediately following what is now
section 706(g)(2)(A). If Congress had meant to grant defendants a statutory
entitlement to present individual defenses in section 706(g)(2)(A), it could
have done so explicitly when it was specifying that right in 706(g)(2)(B)."
Given the differences between the two provisions, it is perhaps not
surprising that Walmart's arguments about individualized defenses actually
rested on 706(g)(2)B)-the "same action" defense available when a
plaintiff or plaintiffs argue that a defendant's actions were the result of both
discriminatory and non-discriminatory motives. The district court rejected
Walmart's argument because the plaintiffs had not asserted claims under the

31. United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 91 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 521 (1986)).
32. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 444 (1986).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). The section heading for § 2000e-5(g) reads, "Injunctions;
appropriate affirmative action; equitable relief; accrual of back pay; reduction of back pay; limitations
on judicial orders."
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
35. Cf Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003) (observing that congressional failure
to include heightened pleading standards in the Title VII mixed-motive provisions "is significant, for
Congress has been unequivocal when imposing heightened proof requirements in other circumstances").
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mixed-motive provision of Title VII.* What is more surprising is that the
Supreme Court's decision never mentions section 706(g)(2)(B) or addresses
the district court's conclusion that that the provision was inapplicable in this
case. Instead, the Court simply imports the reasoning urged by the
defendant as to 706(g)(2)(B) into its discussion of the entirely different
language of section 706(g)(2)(A).
Nothing in the Supreme Court's prior discussion of the language on
which it rested its decision suggested that the Court understood the
provision as a statutory grant of particular rights to defendants. All of the
Supreme Court's prior discussion of the provision has arisen in the context
of challenges to court-ordered or court-endorsed affirmative action plans."
In these cases, both litigants and courts have treated the provision as
limiting in some way what a judicial order may include and have argued
over the scope of those limitations. In that context, the Court has held that a
court could order affirmative remedies even though it was possible that
some people benefitted by those remedies might not have been the victims
of past discrimination by the employer.38 Indeed, the Court specifically
stated:
We . .. hold that § 706(g) does not prohibit a court from ordering, in
appropriate circumstances, affirmative race-conscious relief as a remedy for
past discrimination. Specifically, we hold that such relief may be
appropriate where an employer . .. has engaged in persistent or egregious
discrimination, or where necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of
pervasive discrimination.39

In Sheet Metal Workers, the Court explained why relief that might
reach beyond compensating individual litigants might be necessary in cases
of systemic discrimination. While an injunction to stop discrimination may
be sufficient in some cases, in situations of "particularly longstanding or
egregious discrimination" or when "informal mechanisms may obstruct
equal employment opportunities" affirmative remedies might be necessary
to serve the purposes of Title VII.40 The Court recognized in assessing the
statute's remedial provisions that "[i]n order to foster equal employment
opportunities, Congress gave the lower courts broad power under § 706(g)
to fashion 'the most complete relief possible' to remedy past
discrimination." 4 1 The Wal-Mart Court's interpretation of this same
language thirty-five years later could hardly be more different. Breaking
36. See 222 F.R.D. at 186-87.
37. See Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 421; Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
38. See Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 422. See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of
Discrimination:Last Terms Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78 (1986).
39. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added).
40. Id.at448-51.
41. Id. at 448 (citing Franks,424 U.S. at 770).
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with a long tradition of invoking 706(g)'s broad remedial scope, the Court
instead wielded this remedial provision as a tool to eliminate what may
often be the only available remedial approach in a systemic discrimination
claim.
This re-reading of 706(g)(2)(A) to mean something quite different than
its plain meaning and prior interpretation suggests it was the Court's first
analytical misstep, but not its only one. Even if the language of section
706(g)(2)(A) could be reasonably read as a grant of a statutory right to Title
VII defendants, there is nothing in the language of the statute that specifies
that the right so granted is the right to "individualized determinations of
each employee's eligibility for backpay."4 2 To get to this reading, the Court
had to reinterpret the thirty-four-year-old Teamsters decision.
2.

Reinterpreting Teamsters

In Teamsters, the Court explained that at the liability phase of a claim
of systemic discrimination the plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that "discrimination [is] the company's standard operating
procedure - the regular rather than unusual practice."43 If the plaintiffs
make that showing, a court "may then conclude that a violation has
occurred and determine the appropriate remedy," such as "an injunctive
In
order against continuation of the discriminatory practice . . ."4
circumstances where a plaintiff or plaintiffs seek "individual relief for the
victims of the discriminatory practice, a district court must usually conduct
additional proceedings after the liability phase of the trial to determine the
scope of individual relief."45 During this second stage of the proceedings, if
the defendant seeks to challenge an individual's entitlement to damages,
"the burden then rests on the employer to demonstrate that the individual"
was not harmed by the "policy of discriminatory decisionmaking." 46
The Wal-Mart opinion describes these statements in Teamsters as
establishing a required procedure for pattern and practice cases in which the
remedial stage must involve individualized hearings on each employee's
entitlement to back pay. In fact, Teamsters very explicitly went on to note
that the district courts must have flexibility in crafting a process for
identifying individuals who were "potential victim[s] of unlawful
discrimination" and apportioning a remedy in a manner that balanced the
interests of those potential victims with other employees in the workforce.4 7
The Court emphasized that "the purpose of Congress in vesting broad
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560-61 (2011).
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id. at 362 (citation omitted).
Id. at 363, 367-77.
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equitable powers in Title VII courts was "to make possible the 'fashion(ing)
(of) the most complete relief possible." 4 This focus on flexibility in
remedial assessment was fundamental to every major pattern or practice
decision during the years that the Court was first interpreting and applying
the provisions of Title VII. 49 It was a focus that was consistent not only
with the language, but also with the legislative history of the statute. The
Conference Report accompanying amendment of Title VII in 1972, which
was the genesis of the current language of section 706(g)(2)(A), noted that:
The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide
discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete
relief possible. In dealing with the present section 706(g) the courts have
stressed that the scope of relief under that section of the Act is intended to
make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and that the attainment
of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the particular
unlawful employment practice complained of, but also requires that the
person aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful
employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they
would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.o
The Supreme Court recognized this as "emphatic confirmation that
federal courts are empowered to fashion such relief as the particular
circumstances of a case may require. . . .""

The Teamsters two-phase proceeding for pattern and practice cases has
been applied in a myriad of different circumstances over the past three
decades. While some cases may have involved individual hearings at the
remedial phase, many district judges have used other, more class-wide
approaches to remedial assessment.52 The flexibility inherent within the
Teamsters framework has, until now, permitted courts to determine how
best to calculate a remedy that would serve the statutory purposes of
deterrence and compensation.
In one quick paragraph, Wal-Mart changed the meaning of Teamsters
and its two-stage pattern and practice litigation structure entirely,
transforming it from a flexible approach to pattern and practice litigation
48. Id at 364-65 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (citation
omitted)).
49. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418 (emphasizing the equitable power and wide
discretion the legislature gave courts under Title VII); see also, Franks v. Bowman Transp.Co., Inc., 424
U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976).
50. S. Rep. No. 92-118, at 7168 (1972) (Conf. Rep.) (Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746,
accompanying the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972)
51. Franks, 424 U.S. at 764.
52. See, e.g., McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 281 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that in
circumstances where "the class is large, the promotion or hiring practices are ambiguous, or the illegal
practices continued over an extended period of time, a class-wide approach to the measure of back pay
may be necessary"); see also, Domingo v. New Eng. Fish Co. (Domingo 11), 727 F.2d 1429, 1444 (9th
Cir. 1984); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway V), 681 F.2d 1259, 1264-66 (11th Cir. 1982).
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into a source of proof that defendants are entitled to individualized hearings
on each plaintiff s claims for relief in a systemic discrimination suit.
3.

The Rules EnablingAct?

When Congress gave the Supreme Court the power to "proscribe
general rules of practice and procedure," the legislature specified that
"[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."53
Assessing whether a particular application or interpretation of the Rules of
Civil Procedure would abridge a substantive right requires identifying both
the scope of the substantive right and also what it is that the procedural
rules are doing to abridge that right.
Only with the building blocks of a novel interpretation of section
706(g)(2)(A) and a narrowing of the Teamsters decision could the WalMart opinion make the claim that the district court's certification of the
class violated the Rules Enabling Act. It is a claim that does not withstand
scrutiny.
First, the substantive right identified by the Court-the right to
individualized hearings as to each plaintiffs remedial rights-is not a right
granted by statute. It is a novel "right" created by the Supreme Court. The
language of 706(g)(2)(A) declares what a court cannot do: a court cannot
order payment of back pay to an individual who was not the victim of
discrimination. 54 But a statistically modeled class-wide recovery does not
constitute a court order to pay an individual who was not discriminated
against. The court order is a direction to the defendant found liable for a
pattern or practice of discrimination that it must pay the class a certain
amount. Allocation of that class-wide recovery is rarely done by court
order. Instead, in a typical pattern or practice case, "where a defendant's
total backpay liability to the class is set by formula in the form of a lump
sum award, there is no need for the defendant to participate further in the
issue of which class members are eligible to share in the award."5 ' The
defendant's interest is in its total liability, not the distribution of that total
sum to individual class members."

53. 28 U.S.C. §2072 (2006).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A).
55. See also Pettway V, 681 F.2d 1259, 1266 (1lth Cir. 1982) (finding that the defendant had no
basis for objecting to a formula approach on due process grounds so long as the "amount found due to
the class does not exceed the amount which all members of the class together would have been entitled
to receive under a correct hypothesis, which we must assume the trial court would adopt").
56. It is in part for this reason that neither defendants nor courts are generally involved with the
individualized allocation of a total settlement amount or damages award among plaintiffs. Once the
total dollar amount owed by the defendant and, in many cases, some kind of an allocation formula are
determined, distribution of funds to specific individuals is generally handled by a special master or other
fund administrator. See, e.g., Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane & Richard L.
Marcus, 7AA Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. S. 1784 (3d ed.)(observing that courts often determine "a single
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Neither the language of 706(g) nor the procedure established by the
Court in Teamsters prohibits the calculation of a class-wide back pay award
that is allocated among potential victims in circumstances where even
individual hearings would not realistically identify all of the victims of
discrimination. As discussed further in Part III, cases like Wal-Mart present
precisely these circumstances. Thus, to the extent that classes certified
under Rule 23 take this remedial approach, there is no abridgement of a
substantive right. Indeed, a more serious concern to the courts should be
that an overly restrictive application of Rule 23 will abridge plaintiffs'
substantive Title VII rights, as it will render pattern and practice claims
impossible to pursue.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that it is Rule 23 that courts have read
as authorizing statistical modeling at the remedial phase of a pattern or
practice case. Teamsters, the case in which the Court first established the
procedure for judicial evaluation of pattern or practice claims, was brought
by the Attorney General, not by private plaintiffs. In pattern or practice
suits brought by the government, Rule 23 does not come into play at all.
The Attorney General (now the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (E.E.O.C.)) is authorized by Title VII to pursue pattern or
practice claims and does not have to seek class certification in order to do
so." It is not, therefore, the operation of Rule 23 that risks "denying" a
defendant employer the right to present individualized defenses. It is the
operation of Title VII that makes the remedial phase of a pattern and
practice case look quite different from the remedial portion of an individual
discrimination suit. A finding of pattern or practice liability is a substantive
conclusion. The damages phase of a pattern or practice case is part of the
substantive law-not part of the procedural analysis.
One of the risks of the sort of dicta that these final paragraphs of the
Wal-Mart decision epitomize is that they contain statements of law that are
hard to correct, but were not briefed or argued in any serious way by the
parties. Each step that the Court took to reach the conclusion that the
district court's application of Rule 23 was a violation of the Rules Enabling
Act was controversial and deserved the kind of careful analysis that it
plainly did not receive.
Perhaps one of the best pieces of evidence that this section of the
decision was not thoroughly vetted is that the four dissenting Justices
signed on to this part of the majority opinion. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented because "[a] putative class of this type
may be certifiable under Rule 23(b)(3), if the plaintiffs show that common
class questions "predominate" over issues affecting individuals-e.g.,
award for the class, and then develop an expeditious administrative means of dividing the lump sum
among the class members").
57. See General Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 321-25 (1980).
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qualification for, and the amount of, back pay or compensatory damagesand that a class action is "superior" to other modes of adjudication."" That
position is entirely consistent with their willingness to sign on to that part of
the Court's opinion that held Rule 23(b)(2) cannot be used to certify
employment discrimination class actions seeking back pay.
The dissent cannot, however, be reconciled with the conclusion that
district courts evaluating employment discrimination class actions must
assume that every individual plaintiff s claim will be individually defended.
If a defendant has a right to assert that it will want to litigate each and every
individual damages claim at the remedial phase of a pattern and practice
case, it is nearly impossible to imagine a successful 23(b)(3) certification
because individual issues will always predominate over common
questions.59
If the final paragraphs of the Wal-Mart decision are not simply careless
dicta that the Justices included without evaluating their potential
ramifications, then they are a very calculated effort to make challenges to
structural and systemic discrimination nearly impossible. As I discuss
below, the kind of statistical modeling that the Wal-Mart Court seems to
have rejected is essential to fully capturing the nature of the harm caused by
pattern or practice discrimination.
III.
THE NEED FOR STATISTICAL MODELING

Statistical modeling at the remedial phase is in some contexts the only
effective tool for assessing the harm caused by a pattern and practice of
discrimination. This may increasingly be the case in the modern workplace,
and especially in workplaces like Walmart, which are characterized by "a
large low wage workforce, high turnover, a decentralized management
structure" and highly subjective criteria for employee evaluation."o The
systemic problems of discrimination that have emerged in these
environments cannot be captured with the highly individualized model for
civil rights litigation that the Court endorsed in its Wal-Mart decision. In
many contexts, eliminating statistical modeling as a mechanism for

58. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59. But see Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. C07-04009, 2011 WL 3793962, at *3-4 (N.D.
Iowa Aug. 25, 2011) (declining to certify a class certified under 23(b)(3) and holding that unlike WalMart the instant case is supportable by class-wide proof and so individualized hearings are not
necessary).
60. Richard Ford, Beyond Good and Evil in Civil Rights Law: The Case of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32
Berkeley. J. Emp. & Lab. L. 513, 516 (2011). Professor Ford observes that the individual discrimination
model embodied in cases like McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), were relatively
effective in the manufacturing workplaces of the 1970's, but that the models developed in that context
do not translate well into the new economy. Id at 516-17.
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assessing the harm of discrimination will not mean substituting a more
effective individualized assessment of remedies. Instead, it will mean
leaving those employees harmed by discrimination without any remedy.
There are two primary justifications generally offered for the focus on
individual remedial hearings following a finding of pattern or practice
discrimination by an employer: first, to avoid unfairly penalizing the
employer, and second, to ensure that those who were truly the victims of
discrimination are compensated.6 1 However, the remedial purposes of Title
VII give courts both the authority and the obligation to make victims of
discrimination whole in the best way practicable under the circumstances.
As the Court explained in one of its earliest Title VII decisions, district
courts have "not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which
will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the. past as
well as bar like discrimination in the future."62 The justifications for
individual remedial hearings must be examined in light of this broad
equitable obligation.
As to the first justification, the assumption that individual hearings are
necessary to avoid an unfair penalty on the employer is flawed. The
mistake in this assumption is in significant part the consequence of what
Tristin Green aptly describes as "overreliance on the principal-agent model
in delineating the limits of entity responsibility" for discrimination. Too
often, when litigants, courts and scholars talk about employer liability for
systemic discrimination, they tend to think of the employer, as the principal,
being liable vicariously for an aggregation of the many individual acts of
supervisor-agents. However, when employees are injured by a pattern or
practice of systemic discrimination in the workplace, the employer is liable
"not vicariously, based on a finding of an individual instance or even
several instances of disparate treatment, but directly and systemically, based
on a finding that individual instances of disparate treatment are so
widespread within the organization... that the entity is in some part to
Since employer liability for systemic disparate treatment is
blame."'
appropriately understood as liability for creating the discriminatory
structural and cultural context of the particular workplace, the appropriate
penalties imposed on the employer do not depend on the results
individualized hearings.
Furthermore, in some cases, a class-wide approach to remedies will
come closer to accurately assessing the appropriate remedy than
individualized hearings can do. As Professor Joshua Davis has explained:
61.
62.
U.S. 145,
63.

See, e.g., Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 1976).
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380
152 (1965)).
Green, supra note 2 at 425.

64. Id. at 428.
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[C]lass-wide recoveries can allow courts to require defendants to pay
precisely the amount of harm that they cause. Doing so is important to
various policy goals, most notably achieving optimal deterrence. Individual
recoveries, in contrast, tend to lead to defendants paying more or less than
the damages they caused and, as a result, to excessive or insufficient
deterrence.65
Davis illustrates this point with a scenario in which a class of one
hundred women sue a company and allege that promotions were given in an
illegally discriminatory manner. If the court finds that the company did in
fact operate under a pattern of discrimination, how should the court conduct
the remedial phase of the litigation? Imagine now that sixty of the one
hundred women would in fact have been promoted but for sex
discrimination. In individualized hearings, every woman would be able to
show that she was more likely than not the victim of discrimination. The
defendant would be required to pay damages to one hundred percent of the
plaintiffs, even though the defendant was only truly liable for sixty percent
of that damages award. If the court had taken a statistical modeling
approach to assessing the remedy, it would have awarded a class-wide
damage amount equal to that sixty percent. On the other hand, if only forty
of the class members had lost promotions due to sex discrimination, using a
statistical model, none of them would be able to satisfy the preponderance
of the evidence standard. "The employer would face no liability despite
compelling evidence that it violated the legal rights of 40 women.""
Courts applying statistical models to determine class-wide remedies
first identify what number of positions would have gone to class members
absent discrimination, then estimate the total amount of earnings that class
members would have received over the relevant time had they held those
positions and, finally, subtract a mitigation amount that represents what the
The increasing
class members earned or would have earned."
sophistication of statistical analyses makes assessment of an appropriate
class-wide remedy easier today than it might have been when Title VII was
first enacted. Ultimately, concerns about imposing too high a penalty on a

65. Joshua P. Davis, Class-Wide Recoveries, 3 (Feb. 1, 2011) (on file with author), available at
http://srrn.com/abstract-1768148.
66. Id. at 20.
67. See, e.g., Domingo v. New Eng. Fish Co. (Domingo if), 727 F.2d 1429,1444 (9th Cir. 1984)
("Determination of the [formula] award could proceed along any of several avenues, all of which are
designed to estimate the difference between what non-whites actually earned and what they would have
earned but for the discrimination.") (citation omitted); EEOC v. 0 & G Spring & Wire Forms, 38 F.3d
872, 879 n.9 (detailing actual formula); Hameed v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers, Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 520 (8th Cir. 1980)(same); Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 542 F.2d
452-54, 452 (7th Cir. 1976),; Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway Ill), 494 F.2d 211, 262-63
(5th Cir. 1974); Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 807-08 (3d Cir. 1990)(approving district court's
calculating of damage award).
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defendant, while they have been rhetorically effective, do not withstand
closer analysis.
As to the second justification for requiring individual remedial
hearings, in cases very similar to Wal-Mart, courts have concluded that it is
better to risk some uncertainty in the precise measure of compensation to
Where the choice is
any individual than to offer no compensation."
between no recovery at all for any of the plaintiffs and a slightly rough
justice in allocation of damages, the goals of Title VII are better served by
the class-wide approach.
Thus, courts have recognized over the years that there are
circumstances in which a statistical model for allocating back pay damages
will be fairer and more efficient than a model that requires individual
"When courts deal with harm to a large number of
assessments.6
individuals on a class-wide basis-assessing the overall injury a
defendant's conduct caused-litigation can be more expeditious and less
costly to everyone involved.""o In fact, statistical modeling at the second
stage of pattern or practice litigation has been part of Title VII litigation for
decades. In many cases, individualized hearings have been discounted as
likely to result in a "quagmire of hypothetical judgments."" In employment
discrimination cases challenging pay and promotion disparities,
reconstruction of individual employment histories and outcomes will often
be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Where, for example, the
employer's record retention or other conduct has made individualized
reconstruction of employment decisions impossible, courts have concluded
that allocating relief based upon statistical analyses "has more basis in
reality ... than an individual-by-individual approach."72
The circumstances in Segar v. Smith, a challenge to the Drug
Enforcement Agency's employment practices, provide an excellent example
of a case in which individualized determinations, if even possible, would be
both unfair and inefficient. In that case, agents challenged the evaluation
and promotion practices at the Drug Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.). The
district court found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the criteria used
68. See, e.g., Stewart, 542 F.2d at 453 ("Given a choice between no compensation for black
employees who have been illegally denied promotions and an approximate measure of damages, we
choose the latter."); see also Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("If effective relief
for the victims of discrimination necessarily entails the risk that a few nonvictims might also benefit
from the relief, then the employer, as a proven discriminator, must bear that risk.").
69. Brief for Respondents at 22-25, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No.
10-277), 2011 WL 686407
70. Davis, supra note 65 at 4.
71. Pettway III, 494 F.2d at 260.
72. Id. at 263. See also Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 316-19 (5th Cir. 1993); Stewart,
542 F.2d at 452-53; Hameed, 637 F.2d at 520; Domingo II, 727 F.2d 1429, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1984);
Pitre v. W. Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 1988); Pettway V, 681 F.2d at 1266 (citation
omitted); Segar, 738 F.2d at 1289-91.
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for promotions were pervasively tainted by illegal discrimination.7 But,
while the court concluded that discrimination had skewed evaluations of
black agents, it "could have had no way of knowing how much more
favorable a particular agent's evaluation should have been, or how a fair
evaluation might have affected the agent's chances for obtaining a
particular promotion." 74 The court also found that black agents were
assigned a disproportionate share of undercover assignments, and that those
undercover assignments made promotion less likely, "but the court could
have had no way to divine what other broadening experiences a particular
agent might have had, and no way to gauge how this hypothetical additional
experience would have affected particular promotion decisions."" And,
finally, while the district court concluded that the evidence showed black
agents had received more frequent and more severe discipline, "the court
could have had no way of knowing exactly what effect the disproportionate
disciplinary sanctions had on a particular agent's chances for particular
promotions.""
The court in Segar thus concluded that, under these circumstances, it
would be impossible to reconstruct the promotion history of individual
agents, and a statistical model for the assessment of remedies would be the
fairer and more efficient approach. This conclusion was not a conclusion
that discrimination did not occur, or that any individual agent was not
discriminated against. It was a conclusion that the circumstances of the
workplace would make individual reconstruction impossible.
Consequently, the court ordered class-wide back pay, first determining
a formula for calculating the total amount of the pool and then distributing
the pool evenly among eligible class members.7 As the court of appeals
explained in affirming the district court's remedial order:
To require individualized hearings in these circumstances would be to deny
relief to the bulk of DEA's black agents despite a finding of pervasive
discrimination against them. In effect, DEA would have us preclude relief
unless the remedial order is perfectly tailored to award relief only to those
injured and only in the exact amount of their injury. Though Section 706(g)
generally does not allow for backpay to those whom discrimination has not
injured, this section should not be read as requiring effective denial of
backpay to the large numbers of agents whom DEA's discrimination has
injured in order to account for the risk that a small number of undeserving
individuals might receive backpay.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Segar, 738 F.2d at 1264.
Id. at 1290-91.
Id. at 1291.
Id.
Id. at 1264-65.
Id. at 1291.
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The circumstances in Wal-Mart were similar to those in Segar, in that a
finding of pervasive discrimination by the district court would not have
answered the question of which specific women were victims of that
discrimination. Following the path mapped by Segar and other cases, the
district court approached the remedial phase in Wal-Mart from the starting
point that courts "must usually conduct additional proceedings after the
liability phase of the trial to determine the scope of individual relief."" In a
case like this one however, the court explained:
[W]hile a formula approach is certainly not the norm, it is a potential option
where the employer uses largely subjective criteria for hiring or promotion
decisions, objective requirements are minimal, and many more class
members qualified for the positions than would have been hired or
promoted even absent discrimination. Because it is virtually impossible in
such cases to determine which class members would actually have been
hired or promoted (and thus which class members were the actual victims of
the defendant's discriminatory policy), there is little point in going through
the exercise of individual hearings.so
The district court concluded that, under these circumstances, what
made the most sense was to hold the company liable for an appropriate total
amount and then divide that amount among class members. In reaching this
conclusion, the district court aligned itself with many other courts that had
previously confronted similar problems with individualized assessment of
harm. Moreover, in endorsing this approach, the district court was quite
aware of the concern that those individual class members entitled to share in
the class-wide award be identified as accurately as possible."i
In situations in which the specific victims of systemic discrimination
cannot be identified with certainty, courts have instead sought to identify
which class members "were at least potentially victimized by the
employer's discriminatory policy."82 In the case of a failure to promote
claim, this group would include those who met the minimum qualifications
and either applied for a promotion or were deterred from applying. This
was the approach the district court proposed to take at the remedial phase of
the Wal-Mart litigation, if the case ever reached that stage. 8

79. 222 F.R.D. 136, 175 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 361 (1977)).
80. Id. at 176-177. See also EEOC v. 0 & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872,
879-880 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1994) (approving district court's use of formula approach); Hameed v. Int'l
Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 520-521 & n.18 (8th
Cir. 1980) (approving district court's award of back pay and detailing formula approach); Stewart v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1976) (same); EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp
Works, 668 F. Supp. 1150, 1151-53 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
81. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 117.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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The Supreme Court rejected the district court's approach with no
analysis of either what this approach would actually entail or what the true
particularly given the increasing
In fact,
alternatives might be.
that the district court proposed for
the
approach
sophistication of statistics,
handling damages has proved very effective in determining the appropriate
deterrent damages. While issues about under- or over-payment to particular
class members should not be ignored, the solution of no remedy at all offers
nothing to any class member. And no remedy at all is the most likely
alternative to statistical modeling at the remedial phase of systemic
disparate treatment litigation. The serious consequences of the Court's
casual rejection of this approach to assessing and allocating damages
warranted a level of careful analysis that was entirely missing from the
decision.
IV.

MOVING FORWARD
The Court's rejection of statistical modeling at the remedial phase of a
systemic discrimination suit was curt and in many respects illogical. The
Court quite clearly failed to consider the complex issues raised by
alternative approaches to systemic remedies with any analytical or practical
care. That failure of careful analysis calls the weight of the Court's opinion
as to this issue into serious doubt. Moreover, litigants and courts facing
similar circumstances in future cases should not forget that the brief
discussion of "trial by formula" in Wal-Mart was not necessary to the
Court's holding and should not be accorded precedential value for that
reason as well.
For the time being, however, it is essential to consider other solutions
to the bind that the Wal-Mart decision has incorrectly put the lower courts
and litigants in. One possible solution might be a legislative fix. New
language could be added to 706(g), to provide that "If the court finds that
individualized hearings as to remedies in pattern or practice cases are
infeasible, the court may use alternative methods to determine appropriate
class-wide relief." An amendment of this sort would address the problem
created in this one section of the Wal-Mart decision. For some advocates, it
might seem like too narrow a solution, as it would leave intact the Court's
cramped interpretation of Rule 23(a). A more limited approach might,
however, be more politically viable. Also, the Court rejected statistical
modeling as part of an interpretation of Title VII, not Rule 23. A legislative
effort that sought to address both issues in a single measure would risk the
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unintended consequences that always accompany complex, bundled
legislative measures.84
For the immediate future, the question is how litigants and courts can
move forward to address claims of systemic discrimination in the light of
this decision and without new legislation. One possibility is a greater
reliance on the enforcement efforts of the E.E.O.C. Given that pattern or
practice claims pursued by the E.E.O.C. are not subject to the requirements
of Rule 23, these actions may be a more effective tool for addressing
structural discrimination than private litigation subject to the post-Wal-Mart
interpretation of Rule 23. Of course, the challenge in E.E.O.C. litigation
will be whether defendants can successfully argue that they are entitled to
present individualized defenses as to every specific employee in these cases
as well.
Some hope may also come from the discretion that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure vest in district courts. Rule 23(c)(4) gives district courts
discretion to certify a class only "with respect to particular issues."s Rule
42 of the Federal Rules permits courts "[f]or convenience, to avoid
prejudice, or to expedite and economize," to order separate trials of separate
issues.86 Using these flexible tools given to them by the Rules, courts
confronted with claims of systemic discrimination like those presented in
Wal-Mart may decide to certify a class only for purposes of determining
liability and assessing any appropriate class-wide remedy. At the remedial
phase of the litigation, any individual plaintiffs who sought back pay
damages based on that liability determination could pursue their individual
claims. They could do so, under settled law, with the benefit of a
presumption that the employer had discriminated in their particular cases. 7
Bifurcation of class action suits in this manner is not new." And, in
fact, this was the approach taken by one court just after Wal-Mart was
decided. In United States v. City of New York, the district court examined
the impact of Wal-Mart on a certification order and observed that "WalMart interpreted only Rule 23(a)(2) and (b). The Supreme Court did not
have occasion to decide whether a district court may order (b)(2)
certification, under Rule 23(c)(4), of particular issues raised by disparate
impact or pattern-or-practice disparate treatment claims that satisfy (b)(2)'s

84. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 9 (discussing the unintended consequences of certain provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
85. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
86. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
87. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358-60 (1977).
88. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 516
(1987) ("A class action should not be found unmanageable without exploring the procedural devices
available [including] bifurcating liability and damages. . . .").
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This approach to class certification would permit
requirements."89
consideration of the systemic nature of the claims at the liability phase
without running afoul of Wal-Mart's focus on the individual in considering
certain remedies. Unfortunately, it would present a significant likelihood of
denying compensation to class members who were victims of illegal
discrimination, and a corresponding likelihood of under-penalizing an
employer for systemic discrimination. It would, however, preserve the
possibility of looking at the systemic claim at the liability phase for what it
is-not an aggregation of many individual claims, but a wrong in itself,
with harms that go beyond the specific, quantifiable damages payable to
particular members of the class.
Recognizing the unique and independent nature of the harm caused by
systemic discrimination is an essential goal for the future of discrimination
law. Individual disparate treatment law is not sufficient to address the kinds
of structural discrimination faced by many women today." It is therefore
essential to preserve some mechanism for widening a court's view to give
an accurate picture of the structural, systemic harms being challenged in
cases like Wal-Mart. To treat those few thoughtless paragraphs in the
Supreme Court's decision as the last word on the viability of systemic
disparate treatment claims would be to do a tremendous and unwarranted
disservice to the fundamental principles of equal opportunity and
nondiscrimination.

89. United States v. City of New York, No. C07-2067, 2011 WL 3174084, at *1396 (E.D.N.Y.
July 8, 2011).
90. See, e.g. Green supra note 2 at 435 ("For reasons both practical and doctrinal, individual
disparate treatment law, even properly constructed and applied, cannot fully address discrimination in
the modem workplace."); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law After Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477 (2011).

